

AUG 25 1964

## CIA Officer Sees Vietnam Stalemate

By the Associated Press

Washington

A CIA officer has voiced "serious doubt that victory can be won" in South Vietnam and has suggested the eventual outcome might be a negotiated settlement. Administration sources said this is not the United States Government view.

The conclusion that no military end to the war against Communist guerrillas is in sight was expressed by Willard Matthias, a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of National Estimates, in a June 8 paper on "trends in the World Situation."

Mr. Matthias wrote that the Communist Viet Cong has stepped up its offensive and the counter guerrilla effort "continues to flounder" under poor prosecution by the Saigon government.

Continued large-scale United States support of the antiguerrilla campaign and an end to "further political deterioration within South Vietnam" could at least achieve "a prolonged stalemate," the CIA officer said.

### Neutralization Urged

Mr. Matthias said there is also a chance that future developments "could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization." French President de Gaulle has suggested neutralization of the area, an idea coolly received by the United States Government.

Administration sources made the 50-page document available after learning it would be published in the Chicago Tribune.

Mr. Matthias wrote:

"The guerrilla war in South Vietnam is in its fifth year and no end appears in sight. The Viet Cong in the south, dependent largely upon their own resources but under the direction and control of the Communist regime in the north, are pressing their offensive more vigorously than ever."

"The political mistakes of the Diem regime inhibited the effective prosecution of the war, which is really more of a political contest than a military operation, and led to the regime's destruction. The counter guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and the inspiration necessary."

"There remains serious doubt that victory can be won, and the situation remains very fragile. If large-scale United States support continues and if further political deterioration within South Vietnam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained. There is also a chance that political evolution within the country and developments upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

### Private Views

In releasing the paper, administration sources emphasized these views:

• Mr. Matthias was expressing his own views, not those of the United States Government or of any agency within the United States Government. Members of the National Intelligence Estimates Board, a 12-man CIA committee and others have written numerous papers which are valuable for circulating ideas but do not represent policy.

• Mr. Matthias's memo was circulated among a few lower-ranking officials but was never given to the policy-getting National Security Council. It was submitted for publication to a magazine, which turned it down.

• The antiguerrilla campaign in South Vietnam may be long and arduous, but the United States Government is fully committed to stemming the insurgents there, and believes this will be done.

*Handwritten:* O.K. Readings Room file copy

ROCHESTER, N. Y.  
DEMOCRAT &  
CHRONICLE

m. 132,711

S. 196,874

Front Page    Edit Page    Other Page

Date:

AUG 23 1964

# Row Looms on CIA's 'Can't Win in Asia' Paper

*Democrat and Chronicle Special Service*

WASHINGTON — A ranking Central Intelligence Agency official believes there is "serious doubt" the Communist rebellion in South Viet Nam can be quelled and that a "prolonged stalemate" might be all the West can hope for.

This conclusion, reached in a scholarly paper called "Trends in the World Situation," promises to set off a political explosion because of Sen. Goldwater's determination to make the Vietnamese war a major campaign issue. The Republican presidential candidate accuses the administration of being timid in dealing with Communists.

Although the CIA was prepared to allow publication of the entire paper in a scholarly journal, the administration became concerned when it learned that one

newspaper—the Chicago Tribune—had acquired a copy. The newspaper was understood to be planning a story of the document today.

The State Department took the unusual step of attempting to reduce the impact of the story by making the article available to a small group of State Department reporters Friday night. At the same time, Secretary of State Dean Rusk reportedly said that the document did not represent the administration's viewpoint.

Rusk was said to have emphasized that the paper was the work of one man only—the author of it, Willard Matthias—and that it had no official status.

The 45-page paper, dated June 9, 1964, touched on virtually every aspect of the Cold War. Its controversial section on

South Viet Nam consisted of just these few lines:

"The guerilla war in South Viet Nam is in its fifth year and no end appears in sight. The Viet-Cong in the south, dependent largely on their own resources but under direction and control of the Communist regime in the North, are pressing their offensive more vigorously than ever. The political mistakes of the Diem regime inhibited the effective prosecution of the war, which is really more of a political contest than a military operation, and led to the regime's destruction.

"The counter-guerilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and inspiration necessary.

"There remains serious doubt that victory can be won, and the situation remains very fragile. If large-scale United States support continues, and if further political deterioration within South Viet Nam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained. There is also a chance that political evolution within the country and developments upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based on neutralization."

The paper will probably have international, as well as domestic, political repercussions.

If the Vietnamese came to believe there was predominant sentiment in Washington for a settlement through neutralization, the government's already uncertain grip on the country could be further weakened.

ATLANTA, GA.  
JOURNAL

c. 254,622  
S. 504,761

Front Page    Edit Page    Other Page

Date: AUG 24 1964

## *Dangerous Document*

THE PUBLICATION of a Central Intelligence Agency document which casts doubt on ultimate victory in South Viet Nam and raises the possibility of neutralization of that beleaguered land can only prove embarrassing in both domestic and international politics.

Why such a study was made public at a time such as this is indeed mysterious. In recent weeks we have stepped up our aid to South Viet Nam. The tempo of the conflict in Southeast Asia has increased. Reports of American casualties there have gone steadily up. Internal problems within South Viet Nam have multiplied.

A worse time for publication of such a report could hardly have been chosen.

We do not question the advisability of such a study. Certainly our intelligence people should examine every facet of our operations in Southeast Asia, and should attempt cold and objective evaluations of the chances of victory. But this is something that is not done publicly.

This is the type of material which should be considered in making policy decisions.

Although administration officials have quickly denied that the report represents United States policy, immeasurable harm can result from it. After all, the source of the study, the CIA, is an authoritative government department; a department which is noted for its cold and unemotional and non-political approach to national problems.

Domestically the study cannot help but enhance Sen. Goldwater's charge of a lack of the will to win within the Johnson administration.

Internationally the study cannot help but create doubts within the minds of our friends as to our stand in Southeast Asia.

Unquestionably, a great many people both here and abroad will wonder if this is a significant indication of a "peace at any price" approach which may be taken if the Johnson administration is retained in office.

Acceptable reassurance is going to be hard to come by. It is going to take more than a denial by "high administration officials" that the study represents United States policy. It will require at least a categorical statement to that effect from President Johnson himself, as well as determined actions to show that such a course is not being considered by this government.

**PHILADELPHIA, PA.  
BULLETIN**

e. 718,167  
S. 702,577

Front Edit Other  
Page Page Page

Date: AUG 26 1964

## Goldwater Takes Vacation; He'll 'Fish and Not Shave'

By ADRIAN I. LEE  
Of The Bulletin Staff

Balboa, Calif., Aug. 26—Senator Barry M. Goldwater shook hands with well-wishers and patted a poodle on the head here before going to sea on a converted PT boat to "fish and not shave and have a good time."

For the first time, Goldwater seemed to accept the campaign chores he has shunned—hand-shaking, even poodle patting—as he deplaned at Orange County Airport yesterday afternoon for his last holiday before the opening of his campaign for the Presidency.

Leaving his blue and white chartered aircraft, he worked his way along the wire mesh fence along the runway shaking hands and smiling. His wife, Peggy, who had flown in earlier, met his plane.

### Bars Politicking

Goldwater responded to questions on a possible political purpose to his trip by commenting:

"No, this is a six-day vacation. I'm going out on the ocean and fish, and not shave, and have a good time."

However, on one question regarding President Johnson and Viet Nam, Goldwater said, "He's not being honest, the American public is not being told what is happening over here."

Within two hours of his arrival, Goldwater, his wife and two unidentified couples were at sea aboard the converted PT boat, Sundance, for a cruise.

### Talks of Viet Nam Peace

The Republican nominee flew here from Cleveland, where he

told the national convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars—and the nation—to brace itself for a negotiated peace in South Viet Nam. Goldwater seemed to accept such a peace as perhaps inevitable but warned against neutralization which would leave South Viet Nam open to Communist infiltration.

Goldwater said that "I, along with many others," have to see a "lot of truth" in a Central Intelligence Agency officer's evaluation which suggested there was "a serious doubt that victory can be won" in South Viet Nam.

The Johnson Administration has denied that the evaluation, by Willard Matthias, of the CIA's Board of National Estimates, represents Administration thinking or that a negotiated end to the conflict is planned. The evaluation was made public last Saturday by Administration sources.

### Invites Newsmen

The Senator has invited newsmen aboard the Sundance today as she lies at anchor in Avalon Bay at Catalina Island, just off the California coast.

The number of acceptances threatens to swamp the boat. About 30 newsmen and photographers are expected to make the 35-mile trip from here to Catalina to board the boat.

The senator's invitation was in marked contrast with his refusal to talk to reporters the last time he boarded the boat for a cruise Aug. 1.

The Sundance is owned by Marvin E. Whiteman, a Beverly Hills realtor and longtime friend of Goldwater.

## CIA Pessimism

# Over Viets Not Policy

By STEWART HENSLEY  
United Press International  
WASHINGTON (UPI) —High administration officials said Saturday that a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) document declaring that victory over the Communists in South Viet Nam is doubtful and that eventually it may be necessary to make a "neutralization" deal, does not represent U. S. policy.

The 45-page paper was prepared by Willard Matthias of CIA's Board of National Estimates to assess developments in various parts of the world within the framework of the Soviet-American power relationship.

It was written early this year. It has been circulated among various government agencies with a notation that it had "general approval" of the CIA board which had, however, made no attempt "to reach complete agreement on every point of it."

Administration officials were obviously disturbed by the possible political implications of the document at this time inasmuch as Republican presidential nominee Barry M. Goldwater is charging them with a "no win" foreign policy.

Not Considered By Johnson

They said they wanted to emphasize that the paper had never been presented to or considered by President Johnson's

National Security Council nor the top level U. S. Intelligence Estimate Board.

Aside from the Viet Nam neutralization reference, the document appeared to be a routine summary of the obvious changes brought about by the nuclear stalemate of terror between Russia and the United States, complicated by the Red Chinese-Russian ideological conflict.

The fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States now have the nuclear capability to destroy each other "has not only depreciated the value of strategic power in the achievement of particular objectives; it has also come to circumscribe the use of other instruments of military power," the CIA paper says. "It has become increasingly difficult for either of the great powers to project its military power in conventional form into other areas of the world or into disputes which may arise."

Leadership Lacking

The portion of the document on South Viet Nam, which apparently touched a sensitive administrative nerve said:

"The counter-guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem and partly because the late President Ngo Dinh Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and the inspiration necessary. There remains serious doubt that victory can be won, and the situation remains very fragile. If large-scale U.S. support continues and if further political deterioration within South Viet Nam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained.

President Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk have contended repeatedly that no compromise solution is possible until the Communists in South Viet Nam are beaten and Red China and North Viet Nam demonstrate they intend to "leave their neighbors alone."

## CIA Vietnam Paper Branded Unofficial

State Department Spokesman Says Document  
Has No Relation To U.S. Policies

By HOWARD NORTON

[Washington Bureau of The Sun]

Washington, Aug. 24—A paper by a Republican-oriented American newspaper (the *Chicago Tribune*) last week, written by a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of Estimates, was branded by the State Department today as having no relation to official policy.

Written by Willard Matthias, the paper expresses serious doubts about the possibility of defeating the Communist forces in Vietnam. It states that it may become necessary to arrange "some kind of negotiated settlement, based upon neutralization."

Robert McCloskey, an official spokesman of the State Department, said studies of this kind are frequently written within the Government but indicated he could not explain how the document came to be published.

### Not Policy Statement

"Such a paper is not, nor does it purport to be, a statement on policy on any of the subjects which it discusses," he said.

"I would strongly emphasize," he said, "that the paper was not cleared, discussed nor read by the United States Intelligence Board, by the Vietnam task force, nor by any principal officers of the Department of State or Defense."

The paper was first made public

by a Republican-oriented American newspaper (the *Chicago Tribune*) last week.

In comment on the CIA paper, the newspaper said it had been offered previously to a magazine for publication.

### Political Effect A Factor

There were reports that Administration advisers were concerned over the possible political aspects of the paper, which appeared to support recent Republican charges that the Administration policy toward Vietnam was to regard it as a "no-win" war, after the character of the Korean War.

The State Department spokesman was asked to outline what the United States policy toward a negotiated settlement in Vietnam might be, since the CIA paper was to be branded as not a policy statement.

Reporters were referred to President Johnson's statement early this month at the time he asked for, and received, a strong congressional resolution of support for any military action he might regard as necessary in Southeast Asia.

The President's request—which was granted by Congress—was

for authority to take "all necessary action to protect our armed forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO treaty."

Mr. Johnson assured Congress that if given this authority he would, nevertheless, continue to explore any avenues of political solution that would effectively guarantee the removal of Communist subversion and the preservation of the independence of the nations of the area.

The State Department spokesman warned newsmen specifically against relating this latter part of the President's statement to the CIA paper's comments on Vietnam which made no mention of guarantees against Communist subversion.

The same State Department spokesman declined to speculate on whether the new student riots in Vietnam were Communist-inspired.

## BACKING OF KHANH AFFIRMED BY U.S.

Regime Called 'Best Means'  
of Building Vietnam Unity

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 24—The United States reaffirmed today its support for the South Vietnamese regime in the face of opposition to it by student and religious groups.

Commenting on anti-Government violence that has spread throughout the country in the last two days, a State Department spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, said, "Obviously, anything of a divisive nature is in the interest of neither the Vietnamese Government nor its people."

Although Mr. McCloskey insisted that the riots were an internal matter for the Vietnamese Government and that it was "too early" to discuss the demonstrators' motivations, other officials privately expressed concern.

The anti-Government unrest was viewed as another dangerous element in weakening the structure of the Saigon regime at a time when the Vietcong guerrillas are pressing their attacks with growing vigor and when pressures for a negotiated settlement of the war are rising in many quarters.

President Johnson met at 6 P.M. at the White House with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. It was not immediately known whether the Vietnam situation had been a topic of discussion. Mr. McNamara has just returned from a European vacation.

The main theme of the official comments was emphasis that the United States would take an extremely serious and negative view of any move to oust the regime of President Nguyen Khanh.

The officials cautioned against any analogies between the present charges of "dictatorship" being directed at President Khanh and the situation that prevailed a year ago when opposition was rising against the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

To make the United States' position clear, Mr. McCloskey read the following statement:

"The United States Government fully recognizes the need for national unity in South Vietnam and is, therefore, supporting the Khanh Government as the best means of building such unity, at the same time that the war effort is being prosecuted."

There was no immediate evaluation here of the origins and precise motivations behind the riots. The inclination among officials was to ascribe them more to political than to religious problems, even though tensions between Buddhists and Roman Catholics have reappeared.

Mr. McCloskey said the situation was "not clear at this time" and therefore he could not say whether the riots might have been inspired by Vietcong agitators.

### C.I.A. Study Discounted

Discussing a study suggesting a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, prepared by a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of National Estimates, Mr. McCloskey said: "Such a paper is not nor does it purport to be a statement on policy on any of the subjects which it discusses."

The 45-page study was written by Willard Matthias as a general policy discussion. It was made available Saturday after the administration had become aware that The Chicago Tribune had obtained a copy of the document.

Mr. Matthias's conclusions, which were described as representing his own views and not those of the C.I.A. as a whole and not of the Johnson administration, emphasized pessimism as to the chances of winning the anti-Communist war in Vietnam.

While the classified document had the "general approval" of the C.I.A.'s Board of National Estimates, according to a notation on its cover sheet, there had been no attempt within

the board to seek agreement on all the points.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.  
BULLETIN

e. 718,167  
S. 702,577

Front  
Page

Edit  
Page

Other  
Page

AUG 23 1964

Date:

## Dissident Voice Inside CIA Doubts Victory in Viet Nam

Washington, Aug. 22—(AP)—A CIA officer it was disclosed today, has voiced "serious doubt that victory can be won" in South Viet Nam and suggested that the outcome might be a negotiated settlement.

Administration sources said this is not the U. S. Government view.

The conclusion that no military end of the war against Red guerillas is in sight was expressed by Willard Matthias, a member of the Central Intelligence Agency's 12-man Board of National Estimates.

In a paper on "Trends in the World Situation," Matthias wrote that the Communist Viet Cong have stepped up their offensive, and the counter-guerilla effort "continues to flounder" under poor prosecution by the Saigon government.

Continued large-scale U. S. support of the anti-guerilla campaign and an end of "further political deterioration within South Viet Nam" could at least achieve "a prolonged stalemate," he said.

Matthias said there also is a chance that future developments "could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

French President Charles de Gaulle has suggested neutralization of the area, an idea coolly received by the U. S. Government.

Administration sources made the document available after learning that it would be published in the Chicago Tribune. A magazine had turned it down. There was no explanation of

why Matthias was allowed to offer such a document for publication.

A cover sheet to Matthias' paper was released. Signed by Sherman Kent, chairman of the National Estimates Board, it stated that the paper "has general board approval, though no attempt has been made to reach general agreement on every point of it."

Aside from the Viet Nam reference, the document appeared to be a routine summary of the obvious changes in the world brought about by the nuclear stalemate between Russia and the United States and by the Chinese - Russian ideological conflict.

In releasing the paper, Administration sources emphasized these views:

—Matthias was expressing his own views, not those of the U. S. Government or of any agency within the U. S. Government.

—Matthias' memo was circulated among a few lower-ranking officials, but was never given to the policy-setting National Security Council.

—The campaign in South Viet Nam may be long and arduous, but the U. S. Government is fully committed to stemming the insurgents there and believes this will be done.

—The Government also sees no grounds for negotiation with the Reds over South Viet Nam at this time. A negotiated settlement was reached long ago at Geneva and it is up to the Communists to stop violating the accord.



PHILADELPHIA, PA.  
INQUIRER

m. 603,438  
S. 983,643

Front Edit Other  
Page Page Page

AUG 23 1964

Date:

## Victory in S. Vietnam Doubted in CIA Paper Disavowed as Policy

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 (UPI).—High Administration officials said Saturday that a Central Intelligence Agency document declaring that victory over the Communists in South Vietnam is doubtful and that eventually it may be necessary to make a "neutralization" deal, does not represent U. S. policy.

The 45-page paper, prepared by Willard Matthias of CIA's Board of National Estimates, attempts to assess development in various parts of the world within the framework of the Soviet-American power relationship.

### APPROVED BY AGENCY

It was written early this year. It has been circulated among various Government agencies with a notation that it had "general approval" of the CIA board which had, however, made no attempt "to reach complete agreement on every point of it."

Administration officials were obviously disturbed by the possible political implications of the document at this time inasmuch as Republican Presidential nominee Barry M. Goldwater is charging them with a "no win" foreign policy.

They said they wanted to emphasize that the paper had never been presented to or considered by President Johnson's National Security Council nor the top level U. S. Intelligence estimate board.

### 'ONE MAN'S OPINION'

Official sources disclosed existence of the document when they learned it had been offered for publication as a major outline of American policy. They asserted that this was not true and that the ideas were, as one official put it, "only one man's opinion."

Aside from the Vietnam neutralization reference, the document appeared to be a routine summary of the obvious changes brought about by the nuclear stalemate of terror between Russia and the United States, complicated by the Red Chinese-Soviet ideological conflict.

The fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States now

have the nuclear capability to destroy each other "has not only depreciated the value of strategic power in the achievement of particular objectives; it has also come to circumscribe the use of other instruments of military power," the CIA paper says.

### LIMITS OF POWER

"It has become increasingly difficult for either of the great powers to project its military power in conventional form into other areas of the world or into disputes which may arise."

The paper adds:

With the big powers increasingly inhibited from "brandishing their strategic capabilities and projecting their conventional ones," the "secondary and minor powers" such as France, Egypt, and Indonesia, have taken the opportunity to strengthen their arsenals and try to play a greater role in international affairs.

Matthias wrote that "a nuclear capability in the hands of other than the two great powers is a nuisance and a potential troublemaker, but it is not much of a factor in the world balance of military power or indeed in the respect accorded to its possessors."

## U. S. 'Disowns' CIA Report on 'Neutral' Viet

WASHINGTON, Aug. 24 (UPI) — Administration officials are disturbed by the possible political repercussions of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Document which contains an implication that a compromise with the Communists may eventually be necessary in the South Viet Nam power struggle.

Top-level officials are attempting to make it clear that the CIA report—which declares at one point that victory over the Communists is doubtful and that a "Neutralization" deal may be called for—does not represent U.S. Policy.

### 45-PAGE PAPER

The 45-page paper, prepared by Willard Matthias of CIA's Board of National Estimates, attempts to assess developments in various parts of the world within the framework of the Soviet-American power relationship.

It was written earlier this year. It has been circulated among various government agencies with a notation that it had "general approval" of the CIA Board, which had, however, made no attempt to reach complete agreement on every point of it.

The political implications of the report are obvious, inasmuch as Republican Presidential candidate Barry M. Goldwater is charging the Johnson Administration with a "no-win" foreign policy.

Administration officials say they want to emphasize that the paper has never been presented to or considered by President Johnson's National Security Council or the top level U.S. intelligence estimate board.

Official sources disclosed the existence of the document over the weekend.

AUGUST 27, 1964

## Behind the Headlines

# U.S. Viet-Nam Reports Raise Queries

By ALBERT E. PRUDENCE  
World News Editor

A couple of government reports on South Viet-Nam should make Americans shudder and raise a few sticky questions.

One of the reports — referring to neutralization of South Viet-Nam — could make French President Charles de Gaulle look pretty smug.

The reports are by the Central Intelligence Agency and the General Accounting Office, the watchdog over possible graft or waste of the taxpayer's money.

The CIA report is by Willard Matthias and is entitled "Trends in the World Situation."

HE WROTE in part:

"If large-scale U. S. support continues and if further political deterioration within South Viet-Nam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained.



PRUDENCE

"There is also a chance that political evolution with the country and developments upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

NEUTRALIZATION is the solution offered by France, which battled the Reds in Southeast Asia from Dec. 19, 1946, until it surrendered July 21, 1954. Cost of the Indochina war was put by France at five billion dollars and 100,000 dead or missing.

One big question is what is behind the CIA report? Is the U. S. spy agency trying to influence U. S. policy? Is it preparing the public for a negotiated settlement and eventual withdrawal of U. S. forces from Southeast Asia?

State Department Press Officer Robert McCloskey said that the report prepared for the CIA's Board of Estimates does not reflect U. S. policy.

ANOTHER big question is how the report became public? Usually anything about the CIA is secret.

One report is that the report was released because a newspaper had obtained a

copy. But if such had been "leaked" to a reporter what else may have been "leaked" to Red spies? In short, has the CIA been penetrated by the opposition?

At least, the Reds in Southeast Asia now know that possibly the U. S. could be interested in negotiations and a neutralized South Viet-Nam. As the poet Thomas Campbell wrote more than 100 years ago, "Coming events cast their shadows before."

THE REPORT on use of U. S. funds in Viet-Nam covers the period 1958-1962 and questions whether some funds have been used wisely. Keep in mind, that the U. S. from 1955 through 1962 gave \$1,500,000,000 in aid to South Viet-Nam and that current aid amounts to more than \$1,500,000 a day.

Some of the funds, of course, go into commercial enterprises through private

businesses.

LOOK what happened to kerosene, whisky and perfume, according to the GAO report.

Kerosene, which most low-income groups use for lighting and cooking, was taxed by the Viet-Nam government at 40%; whisky, only afforded by the rich, had practically no tax. Expensive perfume carried a 10% tax, that used normally by the average person—35%.

U. S. inspectors for the GAO also noted that South Viet-Nameese—accustomed to cotton stockings—developed a yen for nylon when the U. S. began providing the funds.

**Firm Vietnam Decision Overdue**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF**

**HON. CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN**

**OF MICHIGAN**

**IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

*Tuesday, September 1, 1964*

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, I believe the American people generally recognize the difficulties under which our Government, as the leading world power and main target of Communist hostility, must operate in the area of international relations. Our people have accepted their burden of heavy taxation, of disappointment and frustration over military reverses, and also tragic announcements of casualties with admirable fortitude. They ask only that their sacrifices serve a worthwhile purpose; point toward an attainable goal. But they do object to pouring tax dollars, and American lives, into a bottomless quicksand, in Asia, in Africa, or anywhere else. Evidence of dissatisfaction with a policy that accepts a long-drawn-out and costly stalemate is contained in an editorial published in the State Journal, of Lansing, Mich., August 25, 1964.

By unanimous consent, and under leave to extend my remarks, I would like to include this temperate, reasoned statement of what I believe is the present attitude of most Americans toward our operations and policies in Vietnam:

**FIRM VIETNAM DECISION BY UNITED STATES IS  
LONG OVERDUE**

A Central Intelligence Agency officer's "serious doubt that victory can be won" in South Vietnam probably is shared by many other Americans in spite of the optimistic views expressed from time to time by various spokesmen for the Johnson administration.

The conclusion that no military end to the war against the Communist guerrillas in the southeast Asian country is in sight was voiced by Willard Matthias, a member of the CIA's Board of National Estimates, in a June 8 paper on "Trends in the World Situation."

Matthias said at that time that the Communist Vietcong had stepped up their offen-

sive while the counter guerrilla effort "continues to flounder" under poor prosecution by the Saigon Government.

In other words, the trend in the part of the world situation in South Vietnam was unfavorable, in Matthias' view, as of last June. There are no indications it is any better now.

Stating that "the guerrilla war in South Vietnam is in its 5th year and no end appears in sight," Matthias continued:

"The political mistakes of the Diem regime inhibited the effective prosecution of the war, which is really more of a political contest than a military operation, and led to the regime's destruction.

"The counter guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem, and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and the inspiration necessary."

The CIA official said there is a chance that future development "could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization," an idea that has been advanced by French President Charles de Gaulle but coolly received by the U.S. administration.

Matthias also said continued large-scale U.S. support of the antiguerrilla campaign and an end to "further political deterioration within South Vietnam" could at least achieve "a prolonged stalemate."

Neither alternative is palatable for the administration, some of whose spokesmen, following repeated but apparently futile visits to the strife-torn country, concede that the struggle will be long and hard but hold out hope for eventual victory.

The CIA officer's 50-page assessment of the situation was made available by administration sources when they learned it would be published in a Chicago newspaper.

This raises the question of whether it would ever have been made known to the American people upon the initiative of an administration which does not share, publicly at least, the pessimistic views expressed by Matthias.

One thing is clear. The unsatisfactory situation in South Vietnam confronts the administration with the responsibility of deciding without more delay upon a policy designed to bring the war to a successful conclusion or to accept a policy of neutralization, unattractive as the latter alternative may be.

As we see it, the administration should make a determined effort to avoid a prolonged stalemate in which Americans would continue to die and more millions of dollars in U.S. resources would be expended.

## C.I.A. Aide Suggests Saigon 'Settlement'

By JACK RAYMOND  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22—An official of the Central Intelligence Agency has suggested the possibility of "some kind of negotiated settlement" of the hostilities in South Vietnam.

According to the proposal, which was made public but not endorsed by Administration sources, the negotiated settlement would be based upon neutralization of the area.

Willard Matthias, a member of the agency's Board of National Estimates, one of the highest units in the body, was the author of the suggestion in a 50-page working paper dated June 8.

Administration officials emphasized that it did not reflect official United States policy. It was apparently made available because a copy was said to have been obtained by The Chicago Tribune, which indicated it planned to print excerpts.

Mr. Matthias observed in his paper that there was "serious doubt that victory can be won." He indicated that, at best, "a prolonged stalemate" might be achieved.

His paper was entitled "Trends in the World Situation."

When it was made available to the press it had a cover sheet, signed by Sherman Kent, chairman of the Board of National Estimates, stating that the papers had "general board approval, though no attempt has been made to reach general agreement on every point of it."

A colleague of Mr. Matthias described the paper as very thoughtful and said it had been distributed "because it was thought-provoking."

He said the best way to describe it was as a "think piece," typical of many distributed throughout the agencies of Gov-

Qualified sources said, however, that while Mr. Matthias's views on negotiating a settlement did not reflect the official United States position, they were widely held in the Government and the subject of recurrent official discussions.

### 'Guarantees' Urged

An opinion that is often put forward in these discussions holds that negotiation simply to bring to an end to hostilities would be wrong without "self-enforcing" guarantees that the South Vietnamese would be left in peace.

At the same time, it is held that negotiation could be contemplated by both Washington and Saigon after military stabilization had been brought about by impressive victories against the Communist Vietcong.

On this point, however, Mr. Matthias's paper was gloomy. He wrote:

"The guerrilla war in South Vietnam is in its fifth year and no end appears in sight. The Vietcong in the south, dependent largely upon their own resources but under the direction and control of the Communist regime in the north, are pressing their offensive more vigorously than ever.

"The political mistakes of the Diem regime inhibited the effective prosecution of the war, which is really more of a political contest than a military operation, and led to the regime's destruction.

"The counter-guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and inspiration necessary.

"There remains serious doubt that victory can be won, and

gile. If large-scale United States support continues and if further political deterioration within South Vietnam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be attained.

"There is also a chance that political evolution within the country and developments upon the world scene could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization."

The Administration has consistently turned away proposals for neutralization as an outcome of the hostilities in South Vietnam. President de Gaulle of France, in his proposals for such a settlement, has been rebuffed repeatedly at the White House and the State Department.

However, from time to time members of Congress have displayed a positive interest in the neutralization proposals. The Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, urged the Administration last February to encourage rather than spurn the French efforts to negotiate with Communist China for a settlement based on neutralization.

LANSING, MICH.  
STATE JOURNAL

e. 70,182

S. 69,552

Front Page      Edit Page      Other Page

Date: AUG 25 1964

## *Firm Viet Nam Decision By U.S. Is Long Overdue*

A Central Intelligence Agency officer's "serious doubt that victory can be won" in South Viet Nam probably is shared by many other Americans in spite of the optimistic views expressed from time to time by various spokesmen for the Johnson administration.

The conclusion that no military end to the war against the Communist guerrillas in the southeast Asian country is in sight was voiced by Willard Matthias, a member of the CIA's Board of National Estimates, in a June 8 paper on "Trends in the World Situation."

Matthias said at that time that the Communist Viet Cong had stepped up their offensive while the counter-guerrilla effort "continues to flounder" under poor prosecution by the Saigon government.

In other words, the trend in the part of the world situation in South Viet Nam was unfavorable, in Matthias' view, as of last June. There are no indications it is any better now.

Stating that "the guerrilla war in South Viet Nam is in its fifth year and no end appears in sight", Matthias continued:

"The political mistakes of the Diem regime inhibited the effective prosecution of the war, which is really more of a political contest than a military operation, and led to the regime's destruction.

"The counter-guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem, and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and the inspiration necessary."

lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization", an idea that has been advanced by French President Charles de Gaulle but coolly received by the U.S. administration.

Matthias also said continued large scale U.S. support of the anti-guerrilla campaign and an end to "further political deterioration within South Viet Nam" could at least achieve "a prolonged stalemate."

Neither alternative is palatable for the administration, some of whose spokesmen, following repeated but apparently futile visits to the strife-torn country, concede that the struggle will be long and hard but hold out hope for eventual victory.

The CIA officer's 50-page assessment of the situation was made available by administration sources when they learned it would be published in a Chicago newspaper.

This raises the question of whether it would ever have been made known to the American people upon the initiative of an administration which does not share, publicly at least, the pessimistic views expressed by Matthias.

One thing is clear. The unsatisfactory situation in South Viet Nam confronts the administration with the responsibility of deciding without more delay upon a policy designed to bring the war to a successful conclusion or to accept a policy of neutralization, unattractive as the latter alternative may be.

As we see it, the administration should make a determined effort to avoid a prolonged stalemate in which more millions of dollars in U.S. resources would be expended.

Approved For Release 2005/03/16 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000900050006-2

The CIA official said there is a chance that future development "could

IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO  
POST REGISTER

e. 14,578

S. 20,248

Front    Edit    Other  
Page    Page    Page

Date: SEP 3 1964

## Tough Attitude Best Peace Stroke

A Central Intelligence Agency study seems to conclude the greatest risk of nuclear war in the years ahead may come from U. S. actions which convince Soviet leaders we lack determination in a crisis.

The study, by Willard Matthias of the CIA Board of National Estimates, says:

"While it is most unlikely that Soviet leaders will choose to carry out actions they know to carry a high risk of general war, such knowledge is not easy to come by...

"In this age of mobile striking forces and hardened missile sites, it does not appear possible to build a nuclear force capable of destroying an enemy's capabilities and simultaneously protecting oneself...

"Even extremely large numbers of high-cost weapons would provide no assurance of victory or even survival. Thus, if there is any valid and rational concept today upon which to develop or measure a strategic military force, it is that of deterrence.

"But one cannot find any rule for determining that a stated level of force will deter and that another will not." Deterrence depends, says Matthias, in very considerable measure on how the enemy sizes up the determination and will of his opponent.

The Matthias study gives an example—how the United States, by seeming to be afraid of a confrontation set the stage for the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Says this CIA paper:

"In the international atmosphere of early 1962, when the Cuban move was

planned, the Soviet leaders were still riding high and the United States probably appeared to them to be uncertain and cautious.

"The United States had chosen not to run the political risks necessary to save the Bay of Pigs expedition. The United States had accepted the erection of the Berlin Wall with little more than verbal pyrotechnics. And the United States had accepted the neutralist solution in Laos.

"Formal U. S. statements regarding Cuba conveyed an air of studied uncertainty.

"In military planning, despite substantially increased programs of missile deployment, the United States was advocating a greater conventional capability and a counter-insurgency program.

"Thus, it probably appeared to the Soviets that the diplomatic and military stance of the United States was that of a power seeking to avoid confrontation and fearful of its consequences, and therefore a power which could be subjected to a series of setbacks without high risks of forceful resistance."

The U. S. show of determination in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 convinced Soviet leaders we did mean business, Matthias says. He thinks that will stand the United States in good stead for a little while.

But he says there will be other times and other places in which Soviet leaders could again read a lack of will power in U. S. actions. This could lead to trouble.

This study has the "general approval" of the CIA Board of National Estimates, "though no attempt has been made to reach complete agreement on every point."



HUNTINGTON, W. VA.  
HERALD-DISPATCH

m. 44,336

Front Edit Other  
Page Page Page

Date: AUG 28 1964

Editorials:

## Peaceful Coexistence' Termed Red Strategy By American Bar

ALTHOUGH THE Johnson administration, through its controlled agencies and leading spokesmen, has been endeavoring to build the myth of a Communist change of character—a new attitude of friendliness and amiability—the facts do not bear out the theory.

Nikita Khrushchev continues to talk just as he has always talked. If there is any new amiability detectable in recent statements from the Kremlin, we fail to find it.

On Tuesday of this week, Russia accused the United States of trying to start a war in the Congo. It hinted at intervention in support of the rebels there.

Previously, Premier Khrushchev professed to view the civil war on Cyprus as some kind of "imperialist plot" hatched in Washington and London. He said Russia will "not remain indifferent" if Turkey continues to back up its Cypriot compatriots.

Turning to Southeast Asia, Khrushchev charged that the "imperialistic forces of the United States" have attacked North Viet Nam and are also "waging an undeclared war against the people of South Viet Nam."

THESE STATEMENTS hardly bear out the administration's endeavors to show that the Communists are no longer interested in stirring up trouble for us around the world, but want to be friendly and helpful.

Contradicting this view, a new study just released by the American Bar Association warns that "peaceful coexistence" has become "a carefully articulated strategy" for Communism's assault on free societies.

To take it as something less, the study states, would be to ignore the fundamental statement of the plan to accomplish the final phase of the attack against the non-Communist world.

Rather than diminishing the issues of the cold war, the study adds, the period of peaceful coexistence tends to obscure them and therefore compounds the dangers.

United States security, the study concludes, is in greater jeopardy today than in the most tense moments of naked Stalinism.

THIS, OF COURSE, is precisely the point of view that Senator Barry Goldwater has been trying to get across to the people of America. And Mr. Goldwater's refusal to be deceived by the "peaceful coexistence" propaganda accounts for the militant hostility of the Communist party in America toward the Republican Presidential nominee.

Gus Hall, the boss of the Communist party, is on record as being deeply concerned about the "ultra-right" movement in the United States. He has stated that it is a "central task" of his party "to mobilize the maximum number of Americans to express themselves politically against the ultra-right," because "the struggle against the ultra-right is decisive for the very future of the electoral system itself."

Of course, "ultra-right" in the Communist sense designates anti-Communists and conservatives who loathe Communism.

BUT THIS does not prevent the Central Intelligence Agency from declaring — in a 47-page report on the state of the world released last week only when the Johnson administration discovered that it had been "leaked" to The Chicago Tribune—that:

"Over the long run, we continue to believe that the gradual changes taking place in the USSR will diminish its hostility to the west and the vigor of its revolutionary effort outside the Communist world . . . This process of change . . . is probably irreversible."

Readers with long memories will recall that Walt W. Rostow, the State Department policy planner, enunciated about the same outlook more than two years ago.

More recently, Senator J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, invited his countrymen to "dispel the cobwebs of myth" which affect their minds and start thinking some "unthinkable thoughts."

Continued



Among these would be the thought that the devil does not reside immutably in Moscow. Another (mentioned in his latest book, "Old Myths And New Realities") is that the United States go "more than halfway" in meeting Communist-inspired complaints about the Panama Canal, and that Russia and other countries be invited to join us in building a new sea-level canal in Central America.

BUT IN SPITE of all these assurances that Russia is now a safe and friendly playmate, and that Communism no longer seeks to incite world revolution and the overthrow of democratic governments, Khrushchev and his pals continue to talk as they have always talked.

The casual hunches of the CIA and the optimistic forecasts of administration spokesmen notwithstanding, we think the safe course for the nation is stated in the Republican Platform—which declares that "Communism is the enemy of this nation in every sense until it can prove that its enmity can be abandoned."

AUG 28 1964

**TUSCALOOSA, ALA.  
NEWS**

e. 20,361

S. 19,564

Front    Edit    Other  
Page    Page    Page

Date: SEP 3 1964

**EDITORIALS**

## **The Backbone Of Deterrence**

The danger of divisive tactics that seem to tear us asunder is sounded in a Central Intelligence Agency's study that determination is a key factor in deterring enemy attacks.

In the study made for the CIA Board of National Estimates it is stated:

"While it is most unlikely that Soviet leaders will choose to carry out actions they know to carry a high risk of general war, such knowledge is not easy to come by. . .

"In this age of mobile striking forces and hardened missile sites, it does not appear possible to build a nuclear force capable of destroying an enemy's capabilities and simultaneously protecting oneself. .

"Even extremely large numbers of high-cost weapons would provide no assurance of victory or even survival. Thus, if there is any valid and rational concept today upon which to develop or measure a strategic military force, it is that of deterrence.

"But one cannot find any rule for determining that a stated level of force will deter and that another will not."

The full effectiveness of our deterrent strength depends on large measure on our determination and unity of purpose.

Thus the order from President Johnson to move decisively in the Gulf of Tonkin incident once again proved to our adversaries that we would move quickly and effectively when attacked. Beyond the military significance of this move was the overwhelming fact that it had the strong and almost unanimous support of a vast majority of the people of this country.

The big mistake the dictators have made in the past is their failure to comprehend the determination and will of the people of this country. We do not need to rattle swords to prove to our foes that we are determined to defend and preserve our freedom.

And we will be doing ourselves a great disservice if we allow the heat of the political campaign to give to the world a feeling that we are so badly divided in national will and purpose that we are uncertain and fearful of the future.

STAMFORD, CONN.  
ADVOCATE

e. 29,269

Front Edit Other  
Page Page Page

Date: AUG 27 1964

## Defeatism

An interesting report, said to be a CIA document, was published in a Chicago newspaper. This report says there is doubt we can win in Viet Nam, that the best we can do there is a stalemate, and that we should negotiate a settlement with the Communists on the basis of establishing a "neutral" South Viet Nam.

It would be unrealistic to pretend that any newspaper could get a secret CIA report without someone in high office agreeing to the "leak." The damaging report was unquestionably a preparation for a defense of a defeatist policy in South Viet Nam. Arguments are already being made that there is no alternative to a "political settlement" in South Viet Nam which will establish a truly neutral government there. It is suggested that this settlement cannot be made until after the elections, because the American people would reject the administration if it took such a course.

The idea that Peking would allow North Viet Nam to become part of a truly neutral state is absurd. Peking is swallowing up its neighbors, not granting them freedom. Thus, the negotiated political settlement would in reality be a surrender. It could not even be confused as a "calculated risk," like Laos.

This is not to say that the war can be won in Viet Nam under present conditions. As long as the enemy sanctuary is safe, it will be impossible to end what is correctly called a stalemate. The question is whether it is in the American interest to risk the war,

or whether we should quit and surrender. This decision is difficult because we are in Viet Nam because it is a bastion against Communism takeover of all Southeast Asia. If South Viet Nam falls, India is flanked and the way to Australia open. The free world will have lost an important area of the world.

The importance of the decision means that it must be decided on the basis of full information, not on leaks designed to protect the party

in power. The administration use of the CIA for political purposes is in itself a sad reflection on its conduct of foreign affairs.

MANCHESTER, N. H.  
UNION LEADER  
(Sunday NEWS)

d. 51,228

S. 44,203

Front Edit Other  
Page Page Page

SEP 3 1964

Date:

IMPORTANT

## Can't Win? Tommyrot!

By EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER

HERE WE GO AGAIN. The "no win policy" continues in Viet Nam in spite of all the brave words and the Navy counterattack in the Gulf of Tonkin. What is worse, friends of the administration are insisting that the United States "cannot win" against communist guerrillas.

It is now clear that just as President Kennedy was satisfied to eliminate the (long range) Soviet missiles from Cuba, leaving Castro there, so President Johnson went out of his way to assure the Communists that in resisting North Vietnamese aggression, the United States was not even thinking of liberating North Viet Nam.

Not only we announced what the Navy was about to do an hour and a half before we struck, but LBJ apparently reassured Mr. K. in Moscow concerning the purely defensive character of our reaction. And now, of all things, he has withdrawn our warships from the Gulf of Tonkin, lest we "provoke" Red China, or Red Russia or Red Korea or Red Somebody. All that the United States wants is a neutral, "free" South Viet Nam. This means a return to the status quo before Red China and North Viet Nam sparked the revolt there. More "pure defense" of the kind that never won anything.

Nor is this all. We expected Sen. Wayne Morse, that "pacifist-isolationist," to furnish arguments to the enemy radios.

### "We Can't Win"

But it is a little surprising to be told by the Central Intelligence Agency that the United States cannot win in South Viet Nam and therefore must negotiate. For the argument flies in the face of recent history.

The argument is one we have heard before: That the weak peoples have invented a method of warfare which enables them to elude and circumvent the great warfare of the great powers. That the only way to defeat the guerrilla is to put much larger numbers of men on the ground. That the experience of the British and the French, the Belgians and the Dutch, is that guerrilla warfare in Africa and Asia can have no victorious military solution.

Interesting if true. But let's look at the record.

1—Had it not been for the regular armies of Chiang Kai-shek and the Americans in the Pacific, the Japanese armies would easily have defeated the Chinese Communist guerrillas.

2—The Philippines government, aided by the United States, thoroughly defeated the communist Huk guerrillas.

3—The British in Malaya by a mixed effort largely consisting in the use of British troops, eliminated Communist guerrillas from that country and set up a pro-Western government in an independent country.

PALESTINE, TEX.  
HERALD-PRESS

e. 7,577  
S. 7,941

Front Page    Edit Page    Other Page

SEP 4 1964

Date:

### TOUGH ATTITUDE INSURES PEACE

In contrast to the soft line taken on Communism by the U.S. State Department, some other authorities within the government long have warned, and continue to warn, that appearance of softness by this country encourages Communism to risk adventures that might lead to war.

It should be encouraging to most Americans that there are still officials in the government who see the strength of the United States, in materiel and in attitude, as the only way to protect our nation and keep the peace of the world. Thus this country's safety will depend on which set of experts the president, whoever he may be, chooses to listen to.

Even as the tippy-toed policies of the State Department continue to be pressed upon the White House, others, including the military and intelligence agencies, submit to the president much more hard-boiled and clear-minded recommendations. An example the other day was a Central Intelligence Agency report on the risk of nuclear war. As reported by Ray Cromley, Newspaper Enterprise Association columnist, here is the gist of the report:

WASHINGTON (NEA) — A Central Intelligence Agency study seems to conclude the greatest risk of nuclear war in the years ahead may come from U.S. actions which convince Soviet leaders we lack determination in a crisis.

The study, by Willard Matthias of the CIA Board of National Estimates, says:

"While it is most unlikely that Soviet leaders will choose to carry out actions they know to carry a high risk of general war, such knowledge is not easy to come by . . .

"In this age of mobile striking forces and hardened missile sites, it does not appear possible to build a nuclear force capable of destroying an enemy's capabilities and simultaneously

protecting oneself.

"Even extremely large numbers of high-cost weapons would provide no assurance of victory or even survival. Thus, if there is any valid and rational concept today upon which to develop or measure a strategic military force, it is that of deterrence.

"But one cannot find any rule for determining that a stated level of force will deter and that another will not." Deterrence depends, says Matthias, in very considerable measure on how the enemy sizes up the determination and will of his opponent.

The Matthias study gives an example—how the United States, by seeming to be afraid of a confrontation, set the stage for the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Says this CIA paper:

"In the international atmosphere of early 1962, when the Cuban move was planned, the Soviet leaders were still riding high and the United States probably appeared to them to be uncertain and cautious.

"The United States had chosen not to run the political risks necessary to save the Bay of Pigs expedition. The United States had accepted the erection of the Berlin Wall with little more than verbal pyrotechnics. And the United States had accepted the neutralist solution in Laos.

"Formal U.S. statements regarding Cuba conveyed an air of studied uncertainty.

"In military planning, despite substantially increased programs of missile deployment, the United States was advocating a greater conventional capability and a counter-insurgency program.

"Thus, it probably appeared to the Soviets that the diplomatic and military stance of the United States was that of a power seeking to avoid confrontation and fearful of its consequences, and therefore a power which could be subjected to a series of setbacks without high risks of forceful resistance."

The U.S. show of determination in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 convinced Soviet leaders we did mean business, Matthias says. He thinks that will stand the United States in good stead for a little while.

But he says there will be other times and places in which Soviet leaders could again read a lack of will power in U.S. actions. This could lead to trouble.

This study has the "general approval" of the CIA Board of National Estimates, "though no attempt has been made to reach complete agreement on every point."

MONROE, LA.  
NEWS-STAR

e. 16,896

Front Page	Edit Page	Other Page
---------------	--------------	---------------

Date: SEP 1 1964

## Short-Lived Firmness

Although it happened during the pre-Democratic convention days, the firm position the United States took on North Viet Nam was not really an action of another age. That was recent history in our book and the problems in connection with our position in south-east Asia cannot be brushed aside.

Now it appears all the firmness was but a brief flurry. Virtually all the rumors concerning our "carrying the war to the enemy" have died.

Since early August, Major General Nguyen Khanh has been in trouble with various South Vietnamese factions. Though generously supplied with military supplies and advice, he has failed to halt the advances of Red guerrilla attacks within his country.

Factional fights within the southeastern countries have made it difficult for governments offering even a small measure of freedom to hold together. With so strong a man as Diem at the helm, South Viet Nam displayed this tendency.

It's no wonder, then, that the more youthful General Khanh — for all his military understanding and leadership — cannot hold the pieces together effectively. He tried to surround himself with a strong palace guard, but his hold

He took office with an ambitious plan to win the confidence of his people and step up the war effort. But as the balance sheet in gains and losses grows longer, we see the communist Viet Cong forces have a definite edge.

The South Vietnamese villagers side with the communists in fear and so-called "religious riots" in the cities result in serious breakdowns in law and order.

Not too many months ago, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara visited southeast Asia. On returning, he predicted our job would be complete in that area as soon as 1965. On a subsequent trip he lost some of that optimism.

Now a Central Intelligence evaluation of South Viet Nam which was made public several weeks ago says the Khanh regime lacked leadership and that "there remains serious doubt that victory can be won."

What was the reasoning behind the highly effective U. S. attack on North Vietnamese PT-boat bases? What had at first seemed to be a change of policy — an actual move toward victory — has apparently turned out to be an impressively won battle in a generally losing proposition.

**SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH  
DESERET NEWS-  
SALT LAKE TELEGRAM**

e. 87,200

Front Page    Edit Page    Other Page

SEP 1 1964

Date:

## The Mess In Viet Nam

UNFORTUNATELY, the image of South Viet Nam that emerges after a week of bloody turmoil can only be described as a mess. At the price of 11 killed and 83 wounded from the rioting, the country has been left with:

1. A civilian as acting premier who at best faces the impossible task of producing political stability in only two months and at worst faces the prospect of being replaced momentarily since he serves at the pleasure of the military clique rather than the people.

2. A military establishment whose rank and file is suffering a letdown in morale as a result of the crisis in Saigon, whose senior officers are more preoccupied with politics than with war, and whose generals are jockeying among themselves for power.

3. A civilian population perched precariously on the brink of religious warfare and which is gripped by what reporters describe as a "nationwide malaise."

Since it is folly to bargain from weakness rather than strength, now is

obviously not the time to seek to negotiate a settlement in Viet Nam with the Communists as has been suggested by many sources from French President DeGaulle to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Indeed, it's questionable if a negotiated settlement will ever be desirable since neighboring Laos shows how the Communists use the "neutralization" of a country to consolidate their gains, only to gobble up more territory later.

But if the people of South Viet Nam have lost their will to resist aggression, there's little the U.S. can do for them. If the will to endure hardship is to be restored, the people of South Viet Nam need to be given a voice in determining their fate.

**THIS MEANS MORE** than just having <sup>this</sup> a civilian as the nominal head of government. It means more than just a new constitution. It means, specifically, that South Viet Nam needs to hold a popular election. The sooner this is done the sooner it can be determined if South Viet Nam has what it takes to prevail against its foes.



WAUKEGAN, ILL.		
NEWS-SUN		
e. 33,593		
Front Page	Edit Page	Other Page
Date: SEP 3 1964		

## An Insurance Policy For Peace

WHAT POSES the greatest risk of nuclear war in the years ahead?

The answer offered in a study by the Central Intelligence Agency is, we think, correct — namely, a miscalculation by Soviet leaders of the U.S. will to resist in a crisis.

The point closely parallels one made by David Lawrence today in his editorial page column analyzing the causes of World War II. Appeasement and vacillation by the United States and Hitler's European neighbors emboldened the Nazi leader to take the reckless steps that produced a world bloodbath.

The CIA study, prepared by Willard Matthias of the CIA Board of National Estimates, notes that deterrence is the key. It is our best insurance against war. This means that, in addition to prodigious nuclear might, a nation must manifest unmistakably a determination to use its power if pushed too far.

The Matthias study gives a good example in reverse — how the United States, by seeming to be afraid of a confrontation, set the stage for the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Says the CIA paper:

"In the international atmosphere of early 1962, when the Cuban move was planned, the Soviet leaders were still riding high and the United States probably appeared to them to be uncertain and cautious.

"The United States had chosen not to run the political risks necessary to

save the Bay of Pigs expedition. The United States had accepted the erection of the Berlin Wall with little more than verbal pyrotechnics. And the United States had accepted the neutralist solution in Laos.

"Formal U.S. statements regarding Cuba conveyed an air of studied uncertainty.

"In military planning, despite substantially increased programs of missile deployment, the United States was advocating a greater conventional capability and a counter-insurgency program.

"Thus, it probably appeared to the Soviets that the diplomatic and military stance of the United States was that of a power seeking to avoid confrontation and fearful of its consequences, and therefore a power which could be subjected to a series of setbacks without high risks of forceful resistance."

THE SOVIETS, of course, badly misjudged our determination in 1962. We meant business and we proved it.

However, this has not stopped further probing by the Soviets or other Communist adversaries, as the complex situation in Southeast Asia illustrates. Our show of toughness in Cuba in 1962 stands us in good stead — but only temporarily. There are now other places and other circumstances where our enemies could misread our will power.

And that, as the saying goes, could be the ball game.